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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Nicholas Shane Clausen appeals from the district court’s order revoking probation after
he was terminated from the Kootenai County Mental Health Court Program. Mr. Clausen
admitted being in violation of the probation condition that required him to successfully complete
the program.  He contends, however, that the district court exceeded its discretionary authority,
as restricted by Idaho Criminal Rule 33(f), when it revoked his probation absent any admission
by him or finding by the court that he had willfully violated the condition of probation.
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(f), as amended in 2012, explicitly limits the court’s discretion to
revoke probation, providing that:
The court shall not revoke probation unless there is an admission by the defendant
or a finding by the court, following a hearing, that the defendant willfully violated
a condition of probation.
(Emphasis added.)
The State acknowledges there was no express admission by Mr. Clausen or articulated
finding by the court that Mr. Clausen willfully violated  his  probation.   But  the  State  does  not
concede reversible error.  Instead, the State presents arguments seeking to avoid addressing the
error, or else to excuse it.  This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s arguments.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Clausen’s Appellant’s Brief and are incorporated herein by reference.
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by revoking Mr. Clausen’s probation in the absence of
any finding or admission that Mr. Clausen’s probation violation had been “willful”?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused It’s Discretion By Revoking Probation Absent An Admission Or
Finding That Mr. Clausen Had Willfully Violated His Probation.
A. Introduction
The State acknowledges there was no express admission by Mr. Clausen, nor any finding
articulated by the district court, that Mr. Clausen had willfully violated his probation.
(Respondent’s Brief, p.4.)  Yet the State refuses to concede that the court’s decision to revoke
probation constitutes reversible error.  Instead, the State argues that any error should be ignored,
asserting that Mr. Clausen was required to argue non-willfulness in the district court to preserve
the  error  for  review.   (Respondent’s  Brief,  p.5.)   Alternatively,  the  State  argues  that  the  error
should be excused, asserting that willfulness is presumed or else can be implied.  (Respondent’s
Brief,  pp.8-9.)   These  arguments  should  be  rejected.   As  set  forth  below,  Mr.  Clausen  had  no
obligation to allege or establish, in the district court, that his violation was non-willful; that
burden rests at all times with the State.  Moreover, Idaho’s appellate courts have not required a
contemporaneous objection to a district court’s decision revoking probation in order to challenge
that decision as an abuse of discretion on appeal.
Additionally, there is no presumption willfulness.  There is no admission by Mr. Clausen
or  finding  by  the  court  that  Mr.  Clausen  willfully  violated  his  probation,  and  the  record  lacks
evidence that would support a finding, if an implicit finding were otherwise to be permitted.
B. The District Court’s Decision To Revoke Mr. Clausen’s Probation Is Properly Before
This Court For Review; Fundamental Error Need Not Be Demonstrated
Contrary to the State’s argument, Mr. Clausen is not required to demonstrate fundamental
error.  The issue of “willfulness,” and the necessity of a willfulness finding before revoking
probation, was necessarily at issue, if not the issue, in the probation revocation proceedings. This
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is so because the legal standard the district court must always apply in determining whether it
may revoke probation is whether the violation was willful or non-willful. See State v. Sanchez,
149 Idaho 102, 106 (2005) (stating “the applicable legal standard the district court must utilize in
determination whether to revoke probation is based upon whether the violation was willful or
non-willful”); I.C.R. 33(f) (the court “shall not revoke probation unless there is an admission …
or a finding … that the defendant willfully violated a condition of probation”); State v. Garner,
161 Idaho 434, 436 (2017) (recognizing that, since the adoption of Rule 33(f), probation may
only be  revoked if the probation violation was willful.)  Thus, the court’s determination of
whether Mr. Clausen’s violation was “willful” was at issue in the district court’s probation
violation disposition proceedings, and therefore properly preserved for appellate review.  The
fundamental error doctrine does not apply.
Moreover, this Court has not previously required a defendant to object to the district
court’s pronouncement of its decision revoking probation in order to preserve his ability to
challenge the revocation decision on appeal.  The purpose of the probation revocation proceeding
is to determine whether sufficient grounds exist for revocation, and, like an appeal that
challenges the sufficiency of evidence to support a jury verdict, or an appeal that challenges the
appropriateness of a sentence, no further objection or request is necessary to appeal the
disposition. See State v. Clontz, 156 Idaho 787, 331 P.3d 529 (Ct. App. 2014) (observing that
“the defendant has not been required to object upon entry of the jury’s verdict to the
insufficiency of the evidence in order to appeal that issue.  Likewise, the defendant has not been
required to object to the sentence pronounced immediately after its pronouncement in order to
challenge on appeal the appropriateness of the sentence.”)
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Contrary to the position advanced by the State (Respondent’s Brief, p.5), the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in State v. Garcia-Rodriquez, 162 Idaho 271 (2017) cannot be applied to
require  Mr.  Clausen  to  allege,  present  and  argue  a  theory  to  establish non-willfulness in the
district court.  As discussed below, the burden of establishing that a defendant’s probation
violation  was  “willful”  rests  at  all  times  with  the  State;  willfulness  is  never  presumed,  and  the
burden never shifts to the defendant to prove that his violation was not willful.  I.C.R. 33(f);
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 106.
C.  Willfulness Is Not Presumed By Or Implied In Mr. Clausen’s Admission
Willfulness is not presumed by, nor implied in, Mr. Clausen’s admission to the probation
violation. The State argues, incorrectly, that, “when a district court finds a probation violation,
unless it specifically finds otherwise, the violation is presumed willful.”  (Respondent’s Brief,
p.8.) (Emphasis added.)  The State cites State v. Peterson, 123 Idaho 49 (Ct. App. 1992) as
supporting this presumption.  However, Peterson holds only that when the probationer admits a
violation, he cannot argue on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to support the violation.
Peterson does not hold whenever probationer admits a violation, the violation is presumed to
have been willful.
1. Resort To Implicit Findings Is Incompatible With The Plain Language Of The
Rule
By adopting Idaho Criminal Rule 33(f), the Supreme Court could not have been more
emphatic or clear in its requirement that there be an actual admission or finding that the
defendant willfully violated a condition of probation.  This requirement cannot be satisfied by an
after-the-fact gleaning of the record for evidence that could support a finding, had a finding been
made.   A  construction  of  the  Rule  that  permits  the  admission  or  finding  to  be  presumed  or
implied would circumvent and undermine the plain language and intent of the Rule, that the
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court “shall not revoke probation unless there is an admission by the defendant or a finding by
the court that the defendant willfully violated a condition of probation.”  I.C.R. 33(f) (emphasis
added).  Allowing the finding to be implied or presumed, after the fact, would allow the Rule to
be disregarded and the court’s compliance with it, excused.
2. Resort To Implicit Findings Is Incompatible With Mr. Clausen’s Due Process
Rights
The State’s position that Rule 33(f) does not require an express admission or finding on
the record is also incompatible with Mr. Clausen’s due process rights as a probationer.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600 (1972) (setting forth minimum
procedural protections and safeguards, to which a parolee is entitled before parole may be
revoked, including “a written statement by the factfinders of the evidence relied on and the
reasons for revoking”); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1759 (1973)
(applying same procedural safeguards to probationers); see also State v. Rogers, 144 Idaho 738,
742 (2007).  These minimum protections include “a written statement by the factfinders as to the
evidence relied on and reasons for revoking” probation.  While the district court need not enter
written findings, the requisite findings must be stated on the record. See State v. Chapman, 111
Idaho 149, 153 (1983).
D. Even If An Implicit Finding Of Willfulness Were Allowed, The Evidence In The Record
Is Insufficient To Support A Finding That Mr. Clausen Willfully Violated His Probation
Even if this Court were to construe Rule 33(f) to permit implicit findings of willfulness,
the evidence in this case is insufficient to support such a finding.
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1. The Documents Cited In The State’s Brief Were Not Offered Or Admitted As
Evidence And Cannot Be Relied Upon To Support An Implicit Finding Of
Willfulness
Contrary to the State’s assertion (Respondent’s Brief, pp.8-9), the record fails to contain
substantial evidence to support a finding that Mr. Clausen willfully violated his probation.  The
State’s description of Mr. Clausen’s mental health court performance is derived almost
exclusively from the attachments to the Motion to Show Cause that was filed in the district court.
(R., pp.190, 198-200.)  However, neither the Motion, nor any of its attached documents (report
of probation violation, progress reports, and conference notes), were offered or admitted as
evidence at Mr. Clausen’s hearing.  (See generally Tr. 9/2/16, p.4, L.4 – p.28, L.4.)
Consequently, these documents cannot provide substantial evidence to support an implied
finding of willfulness. See Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho 933, 936 (Ct. App. 2005) (“Unless
introduced into evidence, pleadings [including sworn affidavits attached thereto] are not
evidence”); Singh v. INS, 213 F.3d 1050, 1054 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[S]tatements in motions are
not evidence and are therefore not entitled to evidentiary weight.”)
2. The Record Lacks Substantial Evidence To Support An Implied Admission Or
Implied Finding That Mr. Clausen Willfully Violated  The  Conditions  Of  His
Probation
Mr.  Clausen’s  probation  violation  hearing  was  conducted  in  two  phases:   an
“admit/deny” phase (Tr. 9/2/16, p.4, L.8 – p.7, L.17), followed by a “disposition” phase
(Tr. 9/2/16, p.7, L.17 – p.28, L.5).  There was not substantial evidence presented at either hearing
phase to support an implied finding that Mr. Clausen “willfully” violated a condition of his
probation.
At  the  admit/deny  phase,  the  district  court  informed  Mr.  Clausen  of  the  specific
allegation of probation violation:
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THE COURT:  Looking at the report of probation violation of July 28th.  No. 1
states on February 25, 2016, Mr. Clausen began participating in the Kootenai
County  Mental  Health  Court  program.   On  July  21,  2016,  Mr.  Clausen  was
terminated from the Mental Health Court program due to noncompliance with its
rules.
Do you admit or deny those allegations?
THE DEFENDANT:  We admit, sir. …
(Tr. 9/2/16, p.5, Ls.9-17.) (Emphasis added.)
Nothing in his admission to the allegation states that Mr. Clausen’s violation of his
probation  condition  was  willful.   Nor  is  there  any  statement  that  his  termination  from  mental
health court for noncompliance with rules was willful.
Following his admission, Mr. Clausen offered, through counsel, that “[h]e didn’t think he
did anything wrong there, but I’m sure the Mental Health Court people have a different
perspective on it.”  (Tr. 9/2/16, p.6, Ls.23-26.)  And after accepting his admission, the district
court found Mr. Clausen to be “in violation of the terms and conditions of his probation for
failing to complete Mental Health Court.”  (Tr. 9/2/16, p.7, Ls.11-16.)  There is absolutely
nothing in this colloquy that states or implies Mr. Clausen had willfully violated his probation.
Nor was there any evidence presented at the subsequent disposition phase of the hearing
support a finding that Mr. Clausen willfully violated his probation.  The State called the
probation officer, Greg Willey, to testify.  (Tr. 9/2/16, p.7, L.22 – p.8, L.10.)  Although he was
asked by the prosecutor to describe Mr. Clausen’s behavior (Tr. 9/2/16, p.9, Ls.9-11), the
probation officer offered no evidence that Mr.  Clausen willfully violated his probation (Tr.
9/2/16, p.9, L.12 – p.14, L.9).
The probation officer testified that Mr. Clausen “struggled a little bit” and became “a
little bit confrontational sometimes.”  (Tr. 9/2/16, p.10, Ls.5-16.)  But the probation officer
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identified  no  “program  rule”  with  which  Mr.  Clausen  had  not  complied,  and  thus,  no  basis  to
support a finding that Mr. Clausen’s noncompliance with the program rules was “willful.”  (See
Tr. 9/2/16, p.9, L.12 – p.14, L.9.)  Additionally, the probation officer made it clear that
Mr. Clausen wanted to stay in the mental health court program (Tr. 9/2/16, p.17, L.16 – p.18,
L.3), and there was no evidence or argument that Mr. Clausen intended to have himself
terminated from the program.  According to the probation officer, the Mental Health Court
“Team” felt Mr. Clausen was “just not ready” for mental health court (Tr. 9/2/16, p.10,
Ls.16-24); but that with new tools and skills obtained through a Rider program, Mr. Clausen
“could come back into Mental Health Court and then be able to successfully complete that
program” (Tr. 9/2/16, p.13, Ls.14-16).
Far from demonstrating that Mr. Clausen had been terminated from the program for
willful noncompliance with program rules, this evidence – which was the only evidence offered
to  explain  the  termination  from  the  Mental  Health  Court  Program  –  shows  the  Team  voted  to
terminate him because it felt he was unable to  complete  the  program.   More  significantly,  the
record contains no evidence to support a finding that Mr. Clausen was terminated for a willful
noncompliance  with  any  program  rule,  and  no  evidence  to  support  a  finding,  even  an  implied
one, that Mr. Clausen willfully violated the condition of his probation.
E. The State Has Failed To Demonstrate Harmless Error
Mr. Clausen has demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked
his probation in the absence of an admission, finding – or substantial evidence that could support
a finding – that he willfully violated a condition of his probation.  Contrary to the State’s
argument, the State has failed to show that the district court’s error was harmless. (Respondent’s
Brief, p.9.)
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F. The State Is Not Entitled To Another Opportunity To Allege, Argue Or Prove
“Willfulness”
In his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Clausen asked this Court to remand his case to the district
court “with instructions that his probation be continued.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.8.)  Contrary to
the  State’s  assertion  (Respondent’s  Brief,  p.4),  Mr.  Clausen  did not ask  that  the  issue  of
willfulness be re-litigated.  The State, having had its chance to allege, argue, and to prove that
Mr. Clausen willfully violated his probation, is not entitled to another opportunity to establish its
case in the district court.  Rather, the purpose of remand is for the district court to determine the
terms and conditions of Mr. Clausen’s continued probation. See State v. Prelwitz, 132 Idaho 191,
194 (1998) (where order revoking probation cannot be sustained, case must be remanded and
probation reinstated).  The proceedings on remand should be limited to that purpose.
.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Clausen respectfully asks this Court to vacate the order revoking his probation and
executing his sentence, and remand his case to the district court for a new disposition hearing,
with directions that his probation be continued.
DATED this 23rd day of August, 2017.
/s/
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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